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Factors influencing the choice of
a safe haven for offloading illegally caught
fish: a comparative analysis of developed
and developing economies
Nerea Marteache1*, Julie Viollaz2 and Gohar A. Petrossian2

Abstract
Using data from 72 countries, this study focuses on factors that affect illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing vessels’ choice of country to offload their catch, with a specific emphasis on the differences between developed
and developing economies. The concept of choice-structuring properties is applied to analyze whether the following
factors influence the selection of a country: concealability of vessels and illegally caught fish; convenience of the
ports; strength of fisheries monitoring, control, and surveillance measures; effectiveness of country governance; and
commitment to wildlife protection regulations. Results indicate that, rather than a country’s level of development,
situational factors play a key role in what country IUU fishing vessels choose. IUU fishing vessels are more likely to
offload illegal catch in countries with better port infrastructure and where concealability is easy to achieve because of
high vessel traffic and large amounts of fish imports/exports; and they are less likely to offload their catch in countries
with strong governance.
Keywords: IUU fishing, Choice-structuring properties, Developing economies, Situational factors
Background
Developing economies generally suffer from more crime
than developed economies (Lafree and Tseloni 2006;
Wolf et al. 2014). They are important locations for transnational crimes, such as drug smuggling (Segopolo 1992)
and human trafficking (Hatchard 2006; UNODC 2006),
as well as a number of other crimes, including financial
crimes like money laundering (Duffy 2000), and environmental crimes, such as illegal dumping of hazardous waste (Lipman 1999). Some of the reasons for these
higher rates of crime are the breakdown of social cohesion that stems from severe income inequality and poverty (Bourguignon 2000; Wolf et al. 2014), corruption,
and the lack of law enforcement capacity (Svensson 2005;
Olken and Pander 2011), all of which allow criminal
*Correspondence: nmarte@csusb.edu
1
Department of Criminal Justice, California State University San
Bernardino, 5500 University Parkway, San Bernardino, CA 92407, USA
Full list of author information is available at the end of the article

actors to successfully commit crimes with little risk of
arrest and prosecution (Hatchard 2006).
Environmental crimes, including wildlife crimes, also
occur more frequently in developing economies. Apart
from the factors mentioned above, the combination of
developing economies’ wealth of biodiversity and developed economies’ problems with resource depletion
(Doughty and Carmichael 2011) often creates a unidirectional flow of illegal wildlife products from developing
to developed economies where rich buyers are available
(Duffy 2000; Fuller et al. 1987; Lin 2005; Popescu 2013).
Adding to this problem, developing economies often
delay implementing environmental regulations and controls until their economy is prosperous, facilitating environmental crimes and resulting in lasting damage to their
ecosystems (Sachs1984–1985; Hatchard 2006).
Developing economies, which account for 50 % of
global fish exports (FAO 2006), are especially affected
by illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing.
They not only lose about $9 billion dollars to IUU fishing
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annually (Black 2007), but illegal fishing operators also
recruit crews in developing economies because they can
take advantage of unregulated labor markets and minimal controls on working conditions (EJF 2005). These
crews are often subjected to such human rights abuses
as financial exploitation and withholding of earnings,
imprisonment aboard the vessel without food and water,
and physical and verbal abuse (EJF 2010).
Beyond the economic and human rights problems it
generates, IUU fishing is also a serious threat for species conservation and global food and job security.
About 4.5 billion people worldwide depend on fish for
15–20 % of their daily animal protein intake, and 8 % of
the global population, primarily from developing economies, works in the fishing industry (FAO 2010). As of
2008, 85 % of the world’s fish stocks were fully exploited,
over-exploited, or depleted, with scholars predicting
a complete collapse of fish stocks by 2048 at this rate
(EFTEC 2008; Worm et al. 2009). Lastly, IUU fishing vessels are also increasingly involved in other illegal activities, including drug and migrant smuggling (UNODC
2011). From an economic and social welfare standpoint,
IUU fishing is a serious problem that is likely to continue
unless successful solutions are found to curb it. Criminologists can play a key role in understanding the drivers
and characteristics of IUU fishing, crafting crime prevention solutions to protect the planet’s biodiversity, as well
as addressing the ancillary economic and social problems
IUU fishing causes.
Co rruption of fisheries’ officials and poor surveillance
and enforcement of regulations for activities carried out
in these countries’ exclusive economic zones (EEZs) have
been cited among the facilitators of IUU fishing (Standing 2008; Palma 2010). They create an ideal environment
for IUU fishing vessels looking to exploit developing
economies’ plentiful marine resources (Palma 2010). The
EEZs of developing economies are the primary origins
of illegally obtained fish (HSTF 2006; MRAG 2008). This
research focuses on the countries where the illegally
caught fish are offloaded, and on the factors that make
some destinations more attractive to IUU fishing vessels.
How is IUU fish offloaded?

To engage in IUU fishing, a fishing vessel must: (1) access
the waters where the fish are, (2) remove the fish from the
water, (3) transport the catch to the destination, and (4)
offload the illegally caught fish at the destination’s port.
Each of these steps must be completed without being
detected and detained by the authorities, and obstructing
any of these steps will jeopardize the entire fishing trip.
Existing criminological research tends to focus on step
(2) of the crime commission process: the opportunities to
remove the fish from water (Petrossian 2015; Petrossian
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and Clarke 2014). The present study, on the contrary,
concentrates on the last step (4) of the crime: where the
illegally caught fish is offloaded and why this destination is chosen. The only existing study that focused on
this step (Petrossian et al. 2015) used the concept of risky
facilities to explain what port characteristics facilitated
vessel entry and offload of illegal catch. It found that IUU
fishing vessels were more likely to visit free ports (ports
exempt from certain laws and customs regulations) and
ports with higher levels of daily general and fishing vessel
traffic, and larger harbor sizes. They were also more likely
to visit ports located in countries where illegal fishing,
corruption, and less effective catch inspection programs
were common.
Theoretical framework

The theoretical framework used in this study is the
concept of choice structuring properties coined by Cornish and Clarke (1987). These are the characteristics or
properties of offenses that “provide a basis for selecting
among alternative courses of action and, hence, effectively structure the offender’s choice” (p. 935). They make
crime attractive to one offender but not another based
on his or her goals, character traits, background, and/or
expertise, such as the skills and resources needed, or the
amount of payoff (Cornish and Clarke 1987). The concept stems from the rational choice perspective (Cornish
and Clarke 1986), which states that when offenders plan
a crime, they weigh the costs and rewards of committing the crime in a rational manner so as to maximize its
rewards and minimize its costs (Felson and Clarke 1998).
They are more likely to choose crimes that have a low risk
of detection, are easy to commit, and provide what they
consider a worthwhile reward.
Two recent criminological studies have used the concept of choice structuring properties to understand the
choices made by criminals. Pires (2011) classified choicestructuring properties into (1) static properties, used to
explain why poaching for the illegal parrot trade is popular in the neo-tropics; and (2) variance properties, used
to explain why some species of parrots are poached more
often than others. Static properties focus on the opportunity structure of the crime, while variance properties are
the factors weighed by the offender to make event-related
decisions regarding the target, location, and tools, among
other factors. Marteache (2012) focused on the variance
properties of theft from luggage at airports to determine
what airport characteristics made them more likely to
experience this type of crime.
The current study

This study builds on previous research by focusing on factors that affect IUU fishing vessels’ choice of country to
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offload their catch, with a specific emphasis on the difference between developed and developing economies. We
compare what group of countries experience more visits
from IUU fishing vessels. On one hand, the direction of
the illegal wildlife trade in general, and of IUU fishing in
particular, leads to the assumption that IUU fishing vessels disproportionately visit developed economies. On
the other hand, given the low enforcement capacity of
developing economies, the fact that most IUU fishing
happens in their EEZs, and the short life-cycle of caught
fish, it is also possible that IUU fishing vessels prefer to
offload their catch in developing economies. This study
also examines what country characteristics facilitate the
offloading of IUU fishing vessels’ illegal catch. Knowing
what specific countries are the primary destinations for
offloading illegally caught fish and what factors influence
IUU fishing vessels’ choice of country can help target law
enforcement resources to prevent financial and biodiversity losses, as well as combat ancillary crimes committed
by IUU fishing vessels.
It is expected that the choice structuring properties
influencing IUU fishers’ decision to offload their catch in
a particular country will be highly specific and depend
heavily on the costs and rewards of committing the crime.
This study identifies 5 variance choice structuring properties relevant to where IUU fishing vessels choose to offload
their illegal catch. These are: the concealability of vessels
and illegally caught fish; the convenience of the ports; the
strength of fisheries monitoring, control, and surveillance
measures (fisheries MCS); the effectiveness of country governance; and the country’s commitment to wildlife protection regulations. Accordingly, it is hypothesized that:
1. Countries where it is easy to conceal not only vessels at port (among heavy vessel traffic), but also
the illegal catch (among the high volume of import
and export of goods in general, and fish in particular), offer good opportunities to operate undetected.
Therefore, IUU fishing vessels will choose to offload
their catch in countries whose ports experience
higher traffic of vessels, goods, and fish.
2. The abundance of marine resources, coupled with the
quality of port infrastructure, affords the convenience
of catching highly sought-after species and offloading
it through a port with easy transport and access to
target markets. Countries with these characteristics
will experience a higher volume of visits by IUU fishing vessels.
3. The existence of strong fisheries MCS is likely to deter
or make it difficult for IUU fishing vessels to offload
their catch. Countries where there is little oversight
over fisheries-related activities, and where such formal surveillance is weak, thereby allowing high levels
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of IUU fishing, will be preferred destinations for IUU
fishing vessels.
4. Countries with poor governance are likely to offer
low-cost, low-effort and high-reward criminal opportunities and will, therefore, be prime destinations
for IUU fishing vessels to offload their catch. Politically unstable and violent countries are less capable
of fighting IUU fishing in their waters and monitoring the legality of offloaded fish. Similarly, the higher
a government’s effectiveness, and the more adept a
country is at controlling corruption within its borders, the better its capacity to prevent these crimes.
5. Lastly, the more conservation treaties and conventions to which a country belongs, the more willing
and active it is likely to be in protecting its wildlife,
and the less likely it is to be visited by IUU fishing
vessels. Countries with large numbers of conservation laws are less likely to tolerate IUU fishing in their
waters and more likely to fine or arrest IUU fishers
who offload their catch in their ports because of their
commitment to wildlife protection.

Methods
Dependent variable

Number of visits by IUU fishing vessels by country In 2010,
The PEW Charitable Trusts (2010), a non-profit organization that conducts research on marine conservation,
among other things, published a report that examined
the global movements of vessels that were known to
carry out IUU fishing from January 2004 to December
2009.1 The study recorded a total of 509 different vessel
movements in 73 countries (or half of all coastal countries) during the study period2. This research uses the
total number of visits by IUU fishing vessels to countries’
ports of entry. Ports of entry include canals, strait passages, anchorages, marinas, and ports.
Independent variables and their data sources

Concealability is measured by the number of vessels in
port, the percent of a country’s ports that are within the
top 125 ports in the world in total cargo volume, and the
value of fish imports and exports.
The number of marine species within the country’s
waters that are highly commercial internationally and the
1

The PEW Charitable Trusts used multiple data sources to create the
list of IUU fishing vessels and to monitor their movements. According to
their report (PEW Charitable Trusts 2010), “the movement data on IUUlisted vessels gathered in this research from across a range of publicly available sources is the most comprehensive compilation of its kind” (p. 8). The
report explains the methodology and its limitations in depth.

2

This research excludes Taiwan from the analyses, as many independent
variables were only available for China and IUU fishing vessels only visited
Taiwan three times during the study period.
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quality of its port infrastructure indicate the convenience
of offloading the catch at that country’s ports.
To measure the level of fisheries monitoring, control
and surveillance, we used the country’s scores on illegal
fishing, catch inspection schemes, observer schemes,
vessel monitoring schemes, and control of access to stop
illegal fishing.
The indicators of the country’s governance are the level
of political stability and the absence of violence and terrorism, the effectiveness of government in general, and
the control of corruption.
Finally, the construct wildlife protection regulation
encompasses the number of environmental protection
and conservation treaties and conventions a country
belongs to, the percentage of its territorial waters that are
marine protected areas, and its environmental sustainability coefficient.
Table 1 lists and describes all the independent variables
used in this study and indicates their data sources, which
are discussed briefly below.
This research uses a total of eight sources to draw data
on the independent variables:
••  University of the Aegean (Greece), Department of
Product and Systems Design Engineering The University of the Aegean, an institution of higher education,
offers different interdisciplinary graduate and postgraduate programs. The Department of Product and
Systems Design Engineering developed the http://
marinetraffic.com website as an academic project,
which was designed to monitor real-time data on the
daily movements of vessels across the world by using
the Automatic-Identification System automated
tracking system (University of the Aegean 2015;
Marine Traffic 2015).
••  National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA)
NGA is a US-based intelligence and combat support
agency that provides geospatial intelligence to first
responders, intelligence professionals, warfighters,
and policy makers. It is the primary federal agency
that provides geospatial intelligence for the Department of Defense and the US Intelligence Community. The Agency works with a network of over 400
governmental agencies and commercial establishments to provide geospatial information on geographically referenced activities on Earth (NGA
2015).
••  American Association of Port Authorities (AAPA) The
AAPA is a trade organization representing more than
130 public port authorities in the US, Canada, Latin
America, and the Caribbean. The organization is
comprised of 350 corporate and 200 associate members, and engages in the promotion of issues related
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•• 

•• 

•• 

•• 

•• 

to trade, transportation, and environment, as well as
port development and operations (AAPA 2015).
United Nations, Fisheries and Agriculture Organization (UN FAO) Established in 1943, the UN FAO is
the permanent United Nations organization dealing
with the issues of food and agriculture (FAO 2015).
Its Fisheries and Aquaculture Department deals with
promoting sustainable development and use of fisheries and aquaculture resources (FAO Fisheries and
Aquaculture 2015).
University of British Columbia, Fisheries Centre (UBC
Fisheries Centre) The UBC Fisheries Centre is the
fisheries research arm of the University of British
Columbia focused on promoting multidisciplinary
studies on marine ecosystems, and promoting collaborations with governments, non-governmental
organizations, and maritime communities (UBC,
Fisheries Centre 2015). The Centre’s http://seaaroundusproject.org project was an initiative, in collaboration with the PEW Charitable Trusts, launched to
study the impact of fisheries on the marine ecosystems globally and to offer solutions through providing data and analyses, as well as conducting research
on global fisheries (The Sea Around Us 2015).
World Economic Forum (WEF) The WEF is an international institution devoted to promoting political,
business, and academic cooperation among countries
to improve the state of the world. The Forum works
closely with international organizations to identify
current and emerging challenges these countries face
and to devise solutions (WEF 2015).
The World Bank Group (WBG) The WBG is a family of five international institutions that provide
financial assistance to developing economies around
the world through low-interest loans, zero- to lowinterest credits, and grants. The WBG also engages in
research and analysis, and provides policy advice and
technical assistance to developing economies (WBG
2015).
The United Nations (UN) Established in 1945, the UN
is an intergovernmental organization devoted to promoting peace and security in the world, and building
cooperation among member states (of which there
are 193) to work together on solving international
problems, human rights issues, and international
conflicts (UN 2015).

Control variable

Country Development Classification The UN World Economic Development Prospects (WEDP) classifies all
countries into three categories: developed economies,
economies in transition, and developing economies,
based solely on their level of economic development.

Governance

Fisheries MCS

Convenience

Data on imports and exports of fish in billion USD
were gathered for 2009

United Nations FAOSTAT database (UN FAO 2009)b

Value of fish imports

Control of corruption

Government effectiveness

Political stability and absence of violence/terrorism

Scores on control of access to stop illegal fishing

Vessel monitoring schemes score

Observer schemes score

Catch inspection schemes score

World Bank Worldwide Governance Indicators
(World Bank 2009)

University of British Columbia (UBC)
(Pitcher et al. 2006)c

World Economic Forum Global Competitiveness
Report (WEF 2009)

Quality of port infrastructure

Illegal fishing score

http://seaaroundus.org (University of British
Columbia and PEW Charitable Trusts)

Number of marine species within the country’s
waters that are highly commercial internationally

Value of fish exports

(a) This source was used to obtain information about
the total number of ports in each country
(b) This source was used to get information about
the top 125 ports by total cargo volume
The calculated percentage was recoded into an
ordinal measure (‘0’ = no ports; ‘1’ = 15 % or less of
ports; ‘2’ = more than 15 % of ports). A total of 43, 21,
and 8 countries fit into these groups, respectively

(a) National Geospatial Intelligence Agency World
Port Index (2009)
(b) American Association of Port Authorities World
Port Rankings Report (AAPA 2009)

% of a country’s ports within the top 125 ports
in the world in total cargo volume

These indicators are complex indices built by the
World Bank using “several hundred variables
obtained from 31 different sources” (e.g. public
opinion surveys, non-profit organization reports,
academic research data, and findings from international non-governmental organizations) (Kaufman,
et al. 2010, p. 2)

For each of these fisheries management indicators,
countries were scored from 0 to 10, with ‘0’ = no
such program is in place and ‘10’ = the program is
in place and is almost entirely effective (Pitcher et al.
2006, p. 11)

Each country was scored on whether vessels
were fishing illegally in its fisheries, with ‘0’ = no;
‘2.5’ = occasionally; ‘5’ = often’ ‘7.5’ = a great deal;
and ‘10’ = almost as much, or more than legal vessels. If no information was available, a score of ‘10’
was given to the country.

The WEF (2009) report measures countries on their
competitiveness on ‘infrastructure’, among other
constructs. The measure ‘quality of port infrastructure’ is one of the subcategories of ‘infrastructure’.
Scores for ports range from ‘1’ = extremely underdeveloped; to ‘7’ = well developed and efficient
by international standards. These scores were
determined by the availability and accessibility of
seaport facilities

Data on highly commercial species were available as
of 2009

The source provides real-time data on the number of
vessels docked at each country’s port. This research
used data from November 10, 2014a

http://www.marinetraffic.com (University of Aegean
(Greece), Department of Product and Systems
Design Engineering)

Number of vessels in port

Explanation of variables and data sources

Concealability

Data sources

Variables

Choice structuring
properties

Table 1 Independent variables used in the study
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For certain countries, the data were only available for 2007

World Economic Forum Global Competitiveness
Report (WEF 2013)

Environmental sustainability coefficient

The WEF report (WEF 2013)f scores countries from ‘1’
for least sustainable to ‘7’ for most sustainable

This variable was calculated by dividing the country’s
‘marine protected areas in square kilometers’ (as
of 2010e) by the country’s area of marine territorial
waters. The former was extracted from data source
(a), the later from data source (b)

These data are only available for 2000, 2010, and 2012

The World Economic Forum added the “environmental sustainability” pillar for the first time in its 2013 report. This measure incorporates several sustainability indicators, such as stringency and enforcement of
environmental regulations, fish stocks’ overexploitation, number of ratified international environmental treaties, and change in forest cover and forest loss

f

e

d
In September 2000, leaders from more than 180 countries met at the UN and ratified the UN Millennium Declaration (2000) that focused on eight Millennium Development Goals. One of these goals was “ensuring
environmental sustainability” by closely tracking progress on several environmental indicators over the next 15 years. One of the indicators was “reducing biodiversity loss” to be achieved by increasing the percent of
terrestrial and marine protected areas

Researchers from the UBC ranked 54 important fishing nations, responsible for more than 95 % of the World’s fish catch on their compliance, with the 1995 UN FAO’s Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries. Countries
were scored on their compliance efforts after UBC researchers examined 2475 reference materials that included international treaties, country synopses from the FAO, national legislation on fisheries, national fisheries
agency reports, and published and “grey” literature. Additionally, researchers consulted with fisheries experts for advice on these scores for the majority of the countries (Pitcher et al. 2006)

c

b

This date was selected randomly. It was not necessary to collect data on multiple dates because, according to Petrossian et al. (2015), the correlation between the average number of daily arrivals in port at a given
month and daily real-time number of vessels on a randomly selected date in a month are positively correlated, with a correlation coefficient value of r = 0.92 and at the p < 0.01 significance level

a

(a) The UN Millennium Development Goals Indicators database http://mdgs.un.org/unsd/mdg/Data.
aspx(2010)d
(b) http://seaaroundus.org (University of British
Columbia and PEW Charitable Trusts)

Percentage of territorial waters that are marine
protected areas

http://seaaroundus.org (University of British Columbia These include treaties and conventions related to
and PEW Charitable Trusts)
fisheries, environment, sustainability and other
conservation-related issues that a country was a
signatory of as of 2009

Number of environmental protection and
conservation treaties and conventions a
country belongs to

Wildlife protection regulation

Explanation of variables and data sources

Data sources

Variables

Choice structuring
properties

Table 1 continued
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According to a 2009 UN WEDP Report (UN 2009), 20 of
the countries included in this study are considered developed economies, 4 are economies in transition (Albania,
Montenegro, Russia and Ukraine), and 48 are developing
economies (see “Appendix 1”). For the purposes of this
analysis, this variable was dichotomized to reflect two
larger groups: ‘developed economies’ and ‘developing
economies or economies in transition’.
Analytical approach

Two distinct analyses were performed as part of this
research. First, a T test analysis was conducted to compare developed and developing economies on the number of visits by IUU fishing vessels made to their ports
and on all independent variables. All five hypotheses
presented in this research were tested by using a negative binomial regression analysis to determine what variables influenced the number of visits a country received
by IUU fishing vessels.

Results
Developing economies experience a higher degree of
IUU fishing in their waters. Developed economies score
significantly higher for all variables measuring concealability and convenience of offloading illegal catch in their
ports. Their governance scores, the level of monitoring of
fisheries, and the extent of protection of wildlife are also
significantly higher. Contrary to what was anticipated,
developed and developing economies did not differ significantly in the number of visits made by IUU fishing
vessels (Table 2).
Multivariate analyses were performed to determine
what factors influenced IUU fishing vessels’ choice to
offload their catch in a particular country. Given the sample size (72 countries), and the collinearity between the
variables included in each construct, principal components analysis was used to combine related variables into
factors for constructs with 3 or more variables. Details
of the analysis can be found in “Appendix 2”. Four constructs were converted into factors: concealability, fisheries MCS, governance, and wildlife protection regulation.
Negative binomial regression was chosen for the multivariate analyses due to two important characteristics of
the dependent variable: (a) data were actual counts of the
number of IUU fishing vessel visits to the countries, and
(b) data were over-dispersed. Missing data for the factors
“fisheries MCS” and “wildlife protection regulation”
reduced the sample size beyond acceptable ratios.3 For
this reason, the analysis was performed with and without
these predictors, with very similar results (see “Appendix
3

The inclusion of both predictors reduced the sample size to 35 countries
(48.6 % of the total sample). Including either one of the two predictors still
reduced the sample size to below 75 % of the original sample.
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3” for a comparison of both models). Table 3 displays the
final model without “fisheries MCS” and “wildlife protection regulation.”
The difference between developed and developing
economies on the number of visits by IUU fishing vessels was not statistically significant. That was confirmed
by the bivariate, as well as multivariate analyses. The UN
country development classification to which a country
belongs (developed vs. developing or in transition) was
not significantly associated with the number of visits by
IUU fishing vessels. The three predictors that did explain
why such vessels prefer to offload their catch in some
countries versus others were concealability, quality of
port infrastructure, and governance.
As expected, concealability and quality of port infrastructure are positively related to the number of visits
to a country by IUU fishing vessels, while governance
is negatively associated with it. According to Table 3, a
unit increase in quality of port infrastructure is expected
to double the number of visits, and a unit increase in
concealability is associated with a 55 % increase in visits, while holding all other variables in the model constant. On the contrary, each unit increase in governance
is expected to decrease the number of IUU fishing vessel visits by 57 %, holding all other predictors constant.
The overall model explains 6.8 % of the variance in the
dependent variable.

Discussion
IUU fishing vessels are more likely to visit countries in
which they can enter and leave the port inconspicuously,
thereby reducing the risk of detection. Countries where
the infrastructure of ports facilitates the transfer of catch
to markets are more convenient to offload illegally caught
fish and move it to markets without being caught. Concealability and quality of port infrastructure are variables
of a situational nature that structure decision making by
IUU fishing vessels. They indicate that countries with
higher volumes of general commercial flow, and better
transportation networks in their ports, are more likely to
be visited by IUU fishing vessels. This is particularly relevant for developed economies, as these countries have an
average of 8 times more vessel traffic and between 13 and
14 times more volume of import and export than developing economies. Additionally, the port infrastructure
of developed economies is, on average, 1.35 times better
than that of the developing economies (see Table 2).
While the level of economic development does not
seem to play a role in where IUU fishing vessels’ decide
to offload their catch, the stability and effectiveness of
the country’s government does. Crime is more likely to
happen and go unnoticed or unpunished in countries at
war, that are politically unstable, or where corruption is

Marteache et al. Crime Sci (2015) 4:32
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Table 2 Comparing developed and developing economies
Variables

Developed economiesa
n = 20

Developing economies
or in transition
n = 52

Sig.b

Effect size (r)

N

Number of visits of IUU fishing vesselsc

5

3

0.366

0.17

72

Vessels in portc

407

52

0.000

0.50

71

% ports within top 125 ports in cargo volumec

15 % or less

0

0.023

0.23

72

Value fish importsc

1,390,025

97,636

0.000

0.51

72

Value fish exportsc

1,590,743

121,364

0.000

0.43

72

Marine species commercial internationally

15

5

0.011

0.27

71

Quality port infrastructure

5.26

3.89

0.000

0.57

60

Illegal fishing in the country’s waters

5.75

7.31

0.014

0.34

42

Catch inspection schemes

5.53

3.35

0.001

0.51

42

Observer schemes

4.69

2.08

0.000

0.55

42

Vessel monitoring schemes

5.75

3.40

0.003

0.44

42

Control of access to stop illegal fishing

4.56

3.35

0.032

0.29

42

Political stability

0.68

Government effectiveness

1.34

−0.43

Control of corruption

1.33

Concealability

Convenience

Fisheries MCS

Governance

Wildlife protection regulation

0.000

0.64

72

−0.27

0.000

0.79

72

−0.39

0.000

0.76

72

# treaties and conventionsc

43

22

0.000

0.61

68

% marine protected areasc

14.05

2.75

0.000

0.42

70

Environmental sustainability

1.06

0.95

0.000

0.69

62

Italic values indicate significant results
For the purposes of this study, the term “economies” as used by the UN (2009) refers to “countries”
a

Means are reported for all normally distributed continuous measures. Medians are reported for non-normally distributed continuous and ordinal measures

b

All non-normally distributed continuous and ordinal measures: Mann–Whitney test (one-tailed; except “Number of visits of IUU fishing vessels”: two-tailed);
normally distributed continuous measures: independent-samples T test (one-tailed)

c

Non-normally distributed variable

Table 3 Negative binomial regression on the number
of visits by IUU fishing vessels to a country
B

(SE)

Sig.

Country development classification

0.073

(0.361)

0.841 1.075 [-0.636, 0.781]

Log # commercial
marine species

0.045

(0.259)

0.861 1.046 [-0.462, 0.553]

Quality of port infrastructure

0.738

(0.184)

0.000 2.091 [0.377, 1.099]

Concealability

0.439

(0.180)

Governance

−0.849 (0.279)

Constant
Pseudo R2
N

−1.499 (0.942)
0.068***
59

Italic values indicate significant results

IRR

95 % CI

0.015 1.551 [0.087, 0.791]
0.002 0.428 [-1.394, -0.303]
0.111 0.223 [-3.346, 0.347]

rampant, because, in those situations, the risk of detection and fear of consequences, if caught, are greatly
diminished. Developing economies disproportionately
suffer from these governance problems; therefore, it is
likely that, when given the choice, IUU fishing vessels will
most likely opt for the country with weaker governance.
One limitation of this research is that it was not possible to run separate multivariate models for developed
and developing economies due to the sample size and the
amount of missing data for some of the independent variables. Such analyses would have helped determine what
specific factors influenced IUU fishing vessels’ decision
to offload their illegal catch in each of the two groups
of countries. Second, data on the independent variables
were not always available for the time period during
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which the data on the dependent variable were collected
(2004–2009). However, every effort has been made to use
2009 data whenever possible. Third, while the use of secondary data for our study has obvious advantages (access
to a variety of data that would be impossible to collect
due to time and money constraints, among others), our
analyses are limited by the quality of the data gathered by
other institutions. For this reason, only data collected by
reputable agencies were deemed appropriate for inclusion in this research. Finally, the multivariate model discussed here only explains about 7 % of the variance in the
dependent variable. However, models with small pseudo
r-square values are not uncommon in criminal justice
research (e.g. in Yu and Maxfield 2014, pseudo r-square
ranges 7–9 %; in Stewart et al. 2004, pseudo r-square
ranges 3–17 %). Given the paucity of research on this
specific topic, this study constitutes a first step toward
understanding what factors influence IUU fishing vessels’
choice of country to offload their catch.
Future analyses could extend this study by using different methods and variables as new data become available.
Another avenue for research would be to compare the 72
countries that were visited by IUU fishing vessels (that
were examined in this research) to the remaining coastal
countries that were not visited, to understand the differences between these two groups.

Conclusion
While developing economies experience higher level
of IUU fishing in their waters (Black 2007), our findings
indicate that there is no difference in the number of times
IUU fishing vessels visit ports in developed versus developing economies. This suggests that the offload of illegally caught fish is actually a global problem that does not
disproportionately affect developing economies.
Rather, it is situational factors that play a key role in
IUU fishing vessels’ decisions to offload in one country rather than another. These vessels prefer to visit
those countries that facilitate an inconspicuous entry
into the port and an easy disposal process for the
catch, which reduce the chances of detection. Such
ease of entry and disposal can take different forms. In
developed economies, higher volumes of fish imports
and exports and better infrastructure offer greater
camouflage. For this reason, the countries with the
most active ports in each region should be subject to
special monitoring, as they constitute points of entry
of illegally caught fish into the area. Some ways of
blocking the opportunities afforded by those countries include the implementation of the 2005 FAO
Port State Model Scheme, which would require that
fishing vessels provide prior notice for port access
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that would include such information as vessel identification, fishing license, and information on catch
and fishing trip, among other things (FAO 2007). This
agreement reduces anonymity and makes it more difficult to offload illegal catch without detection, but
should be strictly implemented in all countries and reevaluated on a regular basis for maximum effectiveness. An increase in general port activity in a country
should lead to enhanced security measures to detect
and detain IUU fishing vessels, and prevention efforts
should concentrate on the busiest countries.
In turn, in developing economies, political instability and high levels of corruption facilitate illegal activity
in general, including the offload of illegal catch at port.
If the existing mechanisms of formal surveillance cannot be trusted, other mechanisms could be put in place.
External monitoring could be conducted by international
organizations that operate independently from the country’s governmental administration; and establishing surveillance and reporting practices among the community
and the fishermen could help prevent offloading of illegal
catch. Timor-Leste, for example, provides local fishermen with free GPS units that they can use to both anonymously report IUU fishing and send a distress signal in
case of emergency. The information on location, date,
and time of an IUU fishing report is automatically sent to
maritime authorities for follow-up (IMCSN 2012).
Second, our results highlight that studying all the different steps that lead to the successful completion of a
crime through, for example, script analysis, is essential
to fully understanding how the crime is committed and
how it should be addressed and prevented. In this case,
although the act of illegally removing fish from a country’s waters does affect developing economies to a greater
extent, countries’ level of economic development is not a
determining factor for IUU fishing vessels when deciding
where to offload their catch. Other factors intervene, and
learning about them in greater detail can help disrupt the
final step of the script of IUU fishing, thereby making it
more difficult for these vessels to dispose of their catch.
IUU fishing is a significant global problem. It affects
the marine ecosystem and disrupts the livelihoods of
millions of people who depend on it for survival. Environmental criminology holds great promise for this issue
because it helps understand the IUU fishing process in
detail, while offering crime prevention interventions
for every step and every context in which IUU fishing
occurs. It is with this conviction that we hope to stimulate criminological interest in the topic and encourage
criminologists to offer their training and skills to ensure
that future generations conserve and continue to benefit
from marine resources.
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Appendix 1
See Table 4.

Table 4 continued
Country

Total number of visits by IUU
fishing vessels, 2004–2009

Djibouti

1

Ecuador

23

Egypt

10

Equatorial Guinea
Ghana

1
11

Table 4 Countries visited by IUU fishing vessels
between 2004 and 2009, by UN economic grouping

India

3

Indonesia

2

Country

Iran

2

Ivory Coast

8

Kenya

1

Lebanon

1

Total number of visits by IUU
fishing vessels, 2004–2009

Developed economies
Australia

2

Liberia

3

Denmark

8

Madagascar

1

Estonia

5

Malaysia

France

2

Mauritania

Germany

17

1
16

Mexico

1

Greece

2

Morocco

9

Iceland

1

Namibia

3

Ireland

1

Nigeria

7

Japan

5

Panama

59

Latvia

5

Peru

1

Lithuania

8

Philippines

5

Malta

4

Sao Tome and Principe

1

Netherlands

9

Senegal

2

Norway

10

Poland

4

South Africa

5

Portugal

4

South Korea

14

Spain

48

Singapore

34

Syria

1

Sweden

1

Thailand

3

United Kingdom

5

Togo

4

13

Tonga

1

United States of America
Economies in transition
Albania
Montenegro

Tunisia

1

1

Turkey

10

1

United Arab Emirates

2

Russia

20

Venezuela

1

Ukraine

18

Vietnam

1

Developing economies
Algeria

1

Angola

1

Argentina

3

Benin

2

Brazil

3

Cameroon

1

Cape Verde

9

Chile

3

China

20

Colombia

16

Congo, D.R. of

1

Costa Rica

3
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Appendix 2
See Table 5.
Table 5 Principal components analysis of the constructs
Factor

Items

Factor loadings Communality

Concealability
N = 71

# vessels in port

0.912

0.832

% ports within 125 top ports

0.689

0.475

Value of fish imports

0.883

0.779

Value of fish exports

0.850

0.722

Kaiser–Meyer–Olkin = 0.790 Eigenvalue = 2.81
Fisheries monitoring, control, and
surveillance
N = 42

Bartlett’s test = p < 0.001

Illegal fishing scorea

% of Variance = 70.2 Determinant = 0.127

0.727

0.529

Catch inspection schemes

0.900

0.810

Observer schemes

0.797

0.636

Vessel monitoring schemes

0.844

0.712

Control of access to stop illegal fishing

0.857

0.735

Kaiser–Meyer–Olkin = 0.834 Eigenvalue = 3.42

Governance
N = 72

Bartlett’s test = p < 001

% of Variance = 68.4 Determinant = 0.059

Political stability

0.858

0.736

Government effectiveness

0.948

0.899

Control of corruption

0.965

0.931

# treaties and conventions for the protection of the environment

0.791

0.626

% territorial waters that are marine protected areas

0.794

0.630

Environmental sustainability

0.797

0.636

Kaiser–Meyer–Olkin = 0.675 Eigenvalue = 2.57

Wildlife protection regulation
N = 57

Bartlett’s test = p < 0.001

% of Variance = 85.5 Determinant = 0.058

Kaiser–Meyer–Olkin = 0.676 Eigenvalue = 1.89

a

Bartlett’s test = p < 0.001

% of Variance = 63.0 Determinant = 0.581

“Illegal fishing score” was reversed prior to its inclusion in the Fisheries MCS factor

Appendix 3
See Table 6.
Table 6 Negative binomial regression on number of visits by IUU fishing vessels to the country: comparison of two
models
Model 1
With all predictors
B
Country development classification
Log # commercial marine species
Quality of port infrastructure
Concealability
Fisheries MCS
Governance
Wildlife protection regulation
Constant

(SE)

−0.551

−0.430

IRR

B

(SE)

IRR

(0.595)

0.576

0.073

(0.361)

1.075

(0.408)

0.651

0.045

(0.259)

1.046

0.702

(0.233)**

2.017

0.738

(0.184)***

2.091

0.514

(0.230)*

1.671

0.439

(0.180)*

1.551

0.069
−1.356

(0.225)

1.072

–

–

–

(0.426)***

0.258

−0.849

(0.279)**

0.428

0.279

(0.260)

1.321

–

–

–

0.124

(1.380)

1.132

−1.499

(0.942)

0.223

Pseudo R2

0.086**

N

35

*** p < 0.001; ** p < 0.01; * p < 0.05

Model 2
Without fisheries MCS and wildlife
protection regulation

0.068***
59
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